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On the Limits of Military Sociology  
 
Patricia Owens 
University of Sussex 
 
Many readers of International Affairs will be familiar with Tarak Barkawi’s frequent 
skewering of IR theories and debates, from his demolition of liberal peace and so-called 
“schools” of critical security studies to his elevation of empire and critical war studies. In 
each intervention, Barkawi engaged directly with core IR debates and ruthlessly exposed 
their flawed premises, establishing a new agenda for research in the process. In doing so, 
he has shaped at least two generations of IR scholarship. The influence of Soldiers of 
empire could be of a totally different order. It will come less from the book’s main 
arguments than the quality of the scholarship and style of intellectual engagement. This 
book, Soldiers of empire, delivers on something far more urgent than a new agenda for 
research.1 It is a yardstick for those in our field interested in producing scholarship that is 
critical, but also of real substance and originality. That is, work that is historically rich, 
theoretically engaged, well-written, multi-and inter-disciplinary, and pays no heed 
whatsoever to the debilitating distinctions between IR subfields.  
However, as one would expect of a book of real substance, there are problems that 
will limit its intellectual reach. In this review forum, I focus on two. The first relates to 
the book’s main claims about rituals, military socialization and the structure of war. 
Barkawi argues that it is not the politics of any particular war, but the conditions of 
military service that matter most to how soldiers behave. ‘What was immediate and 
present’, he writes, ‘- deprivation, fatigue, fear for life and limb, for oneself and others - 
was often far more important in shaping action than the distant high politics of the war. In 
this, colonial soldiers were little different from national ones’ (83). In addition to concern 
for basic life needs, Barkawi points to the significance of ritual systems. Military drills, 
he writes, ‘dispose people toward acting in particular kinds of ways, those intended by 
ritual experts’ (185).  
In Soldiers of empire, these two claims that are quite obvious at first have an 
extremely surprising intellectual and political origin. It is a great irony that a landmark 
book of postcolonial war studies relies so heavily on nineteenth-century Eurocentric 
bourgeois sociology. Specifically, Barkawi’s main claims about the conditions of military 
service and rituals draw on Emile Durkheim’s functionalist and apolitical account of how 
French working classes could be bound to the nation, refracted through his racist account 
of Australian aboriginal clans. Durkheim’s agenda was less to understand than to bring 
about and rationalise worker’s subordination under capitalist modernity, to explain and 
then curb popular rebellions. For Durkheim, working classes could be made to behave in 
particular ways given particular structures of incentives. For Barkawi, ‘soldiers acted in 
comparable ways when caught in similar straits during the Burma campaign’ (193). 
Neither of these sentences is exactly wrong. But one of them certainly and the other one 
potentially risks mis-describing and therefore naturalising how these conditions are 
produced. Taking control of the exigencies and necessities of life is the oldest and truest 
form of coercion and discipline. Of course, colonial soldiers, like national soldiers and all 
human beings, tend to behave in certain ways when directly confronted by extreme 
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structural powers of life and death. To understand this, we don’t need to elevate 
Durkheim and other prophets of social engineering more interested in naturalising rather 
than fully interrogating the production of this form of power.2  
The second point is that in a book about how soldiers are made and why they fight, 
of how military solidarity, hierarchy, and authority are instantiated, it is surprising that 
there is no sustained theoretical account of gender difference. There is plenty of 
discussion of one aspect of its significance. There is a great deal on ‘military masculinity’, 
how it was instrumentally used to bond together soldiers within and across cultural 
divides; that the theory of martial races manufactures war-like and ‘effeminate’ races 
(21); that ‘soldiering is a strategic site for the production of masculinity’ (276). In 
addition, women make brief appearances usually through the eyes of soldiers as 
“prostitutes”; disloyal wives (237); wives of British officers barred from dancing with or 
swimming near Indian officers (96, 99); victims of rape; as mothers and wives sending 
pleading, complaining, ignorant letters to their sons and husbands serving abroad even as 
they are apparently the real beneficiaries of men’s military service (91).  
Thus, we have ‘military masculinity’, on the one hand, and clichés of women, on 
the other. Clearly, this reproduces rather than interrogates the gender relations that make 
‘military masculinities’ possible. While the central arguments of the book completely 
depend on it, there is nothing on the mutual imbrication of war and the constitution of 
binary sexual difference. Barkawi argues that military education in the imperial army 
‘required less expert cultural knowledge than might be thought’ (157). Yet the British 
army in India could get away with a minimum of ethnographic knowledge because 
gender was already doing much, if not all, of its work. Of this, we hear virtually nothing. 
The British Indian army was able to adapt so well after defeat, ‘to modularly reconstruct 
difference and rearrange group identity’, because pre-existing and flexible gendered 
relations of power could be harnessed to its ends (50). The sole focus on military 
masculinity and clumsy treatment of women is a missed opportunity. As many feminist 
scholars have shown, war is parasitic on gendered relations of power. The gender binary, 
in turn, is almost unimaginable outside war. We could even say that the very origin of the 
binary - one that makes little sense given the diversity of bodies - is preparation for war, 
in how soldiers are made and why they fight.  
To think through these relations would not just be an add-on to an otherwise 
excellent book, which Barkawi may respond ‘is not about gender’. Its absence distorts 
and contorts Soldiers of empire, reducing its intellectual and political power in a manner 
comparable to non-feminist analyses of ‘gender’ in social constructivism. For example, 
‘ham-fisted’ is used to describe the practice of forcing new recruits to wear-women’s 
clothing if they discharge weapons too soon. The British effort to instil anti-Japanese 
hatred by telling them ‘Jap fathers sell their daughters into brothels’ is called a 
‘contrivance’ (235). Most troubling of all, ‘kept busy’ is used as a euphemism for women 
being raped by soldiers in what is called a ‘lurid’ ‘escapade’ (59). That the women were 
sex workers does not contradict the point; they are among most vulnerable to being raped. 
These moments betray Soldiers of empire’s discomfort with gender. Terms like ‘ham-
fisted’, ‘contrivance’, and ‘lurid’ imply that we all already know what it takes to make 
soldiers but we can pass over it quickly because there are other more important things to 
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discuss. The frequent acknowledgement of ‘military masculinities’ is no substitution for a 
full and proper accounting of how it is produced.  
It is only because Soldiers of Empire is so important that such fundamental issues 
are at stake. Barkawi has produced an outstanding work of original scholarship that is an 
inspiration. It fully succeeds in its most important intention of ‘strip[ing] away not only 
some of the chauvinism which governs military writing, but also the Western 
triumphalism’ (257). And more broadly it sets a new benchmark for book length original 
scholarship that has a shelf life of more than three years and a multidisciplinary 
readership beyond one section of BISA or the ISA. Yet, still battle’s structure and war’s 
power have not yet been fully captured. But Barkawi can hardly be blamed for that. 
